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Mitch L. WerBell V 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in California Department of 
Toxic Substances Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC reminds prospective 
purchasers of tax-defaulted property of their responsibility for due 
diligence. The case addressed the reach of the third-party defense to a 
CERCLA cost recovery action. The court determined that CERCLA’s 
third-party defense did not apply to a company which purchased a 
contaminated property at a tax auction because of its “contractual 
relationship” with the former owner-polluter and because the relevant 
contaminating acts occurred “in connection with” the prior polluter’s 
ownership of the site.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary issue in California Department of Toxic Substances 
Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC1 was one of first impression for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—whether the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act’s (“CERCLA”) third-party defense extends to a tax-sale purchaser of 
a contaminated property.2 Specifically, the court sought to determine 
whether, under CERCLA, a tax-sale purchaser of a contaminated site had 
a “contractual relationship” with the prior owner-contaminator and, if so, 
whether the pollution at issue in the litigation occurred “in connection with 
[their] contractual relationship.”3 For its analysis, the court emphasized 
CERCLA federal law, not state law, would control.4 The court ascertained 
that Congress intended to treat tax-sale purchasers the same as ordinary 
purchasers when the CERCLA-related Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (“SARA”) was enacted.5 Moreover, the court held 
Westside Delivery, LLC (“Westside”), the tax-sale purchaser of the 
contaminated site, had a contractual relationship with that property’s prior 
owner, as that term is defined in CERCLA.6 Finally, the court concluded 
that the prior owner’s contaminating acts––its release of hazardous 
substances while owning the property––occurred in connection to its 
contractual relationship with Westside.7  
                                                     
1. 888 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2018).  
2.  Id. at 1088. 
3.  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2018)) (discussing the third of 
CERLA’s three affirmative defenses to liability). 
4.  Id. at 1093–1094. 
5.  Id. at 1091–1092, 1098; see also Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 
(1986).  
6.  Id. at 1091–1092. 
7.  Id. at 1101. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Davis Chemical Company (“Davis”) owned a facility (“Site”) 
in Los Angeles where it recycled used solvents from 1949 to 1990.8 The 
California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) ordered 
Davis to stop all hazardous-waste-related activities in October 1990.9 Two 
years later, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
recommended that DTSC investigate and remediate the Site.10 DTSC then 
identified former Davis customers as potentially responsible parties 
(“PRPs”) that might be liable for remediation costs pursuant to CERCLA, 
but never successfully implemented a remediation agreement.11 During 
DTSC’s efforts to locate other PRPs to bear remediation costs, the Los 
Angeles County Tax Collector held a tax auction in August 2009 because 
Davis had failed to pay the Site’s property taxes.12 Westside submitted the 
highest bid for the Site and received a tax deed in September 2009.13 
Importantly, the tax auction materials advised bidders that they bore the 
responsibility to investigate the Site, notwithstanding the site’s absence 
from a “not exhaustive” list of “Potentially Contaminated Parcels” 
included in those auction materials.14 Subsequent to 2009, Westside did 
not conduct any operations at the Site.15 
Meanwhile, from 2010 to 2015, DTSC remediated the Site and 
later brought a cost recovery action against Westside under CERCLA.16 In 
turn, Westside asserted CERCLA’s third-party defense, which shields a 
party from liability if it can demonstrate that the damages from a release 
or threat of release of hazardous substances were caused solely by an actor 
other than “one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a 
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the 
defendant.”17 Westside argued that the third-party defense precluded it 
from liability because other third parties, including Davis, caused the 
Site’s contamination and because Westside did not enter a contractual 
relationship with those third parties under CERCLA.18 The district court 
agreed and awarded Westside summary judgment, after which DTSC 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.19 The Ninth Circuit reversed that district 
                                                     
8.    Id. at 1089. 
9. Id.  
10.  Id. (A group of environmental consultants also completed a study in 
1996 which found that the Site’s soil possessed several hazardous 
substances at elevated levels.). 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16  Id. 
17.  Id. at 1089–1091 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)) (emphasis added). 
18.  Id. at 1089–1090. 
19.  Id. at 1090. 
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court ruling and remanded the case to determine the extent of Westside’s 
liability and its related required contribution toward cleanup costs.20 
III. ANALYSIS 
 To analyze the two principle issues in this case––whether the tax 
deed created a contractual relationship as interpreted by CERCLA, and 
whether the relevant contamination occurred in connection with that 
contractual relationship21––the court discussed both CERCLA and 
connected laws, including the clarifying SARA amendments, their related 
defenses and definitions, and the California tax-sale structure.22  
A. CERCLA & SARA 
CERCLA, a strict liability statute, was enacted “in response to the 
serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.”23 
Relevant to this action, CERCLA’s framework permits a state to recover 
its costs of responding to a “release” or “threatened release” of hazardous 
substances from a site’s owner, even if the owner did not place the 
substances at the site.24 The critical element requires the defendant-owner 
to have owned the site at the time when the state responded.25 The court 
conducted a thorough examination of the term contractual relationship in 
the 1986 SARA, a statute “aimed at speeding cleanup and forcing quicker 
action by the EPA.”26 SARA included the “innocent-landowner defense” 
as a new type of third-party defense and gave definition to the formerly 
undefined term “contractual relationship.”27 The statute provides, in 
relevant part, that “[t]he term ‘contractual relationship’ includes, but is not 
limited to, land contracts, deeds . . . or other instruments transferring title 
                                                     
20.  Id. at 1088–1089. 
21  Id. at 1088. 
22.  Id. at 1092–1093 (citing Carloss v. County of Alameda, 194 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 784, 791, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing California’s 
tax-sale system for context with the contractual relationship 
analysis); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 126, 3436, 3691(a)(1)(A) (In 
California, the tax collector must attempt to sell a tax-defaulted 
property at an auction directly to a private party.)). 
23.  Id. at 1090 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009)); see also Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 
499 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 2007) (also discussing CERCLA, at 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(9)(b), as reactionary in that it “‘looks backward in time 
and imposes wide-ranging liability’ on parties who are in some way 
responsible for contaminating a facility”). 
24.  Id. at 1090 (citing Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 
710 F.3d 946, 956–957 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
25.  Id. (citing California Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Hearthside 
Residential Corp., 613 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
26.  Id. at 1091 (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. V. Unocal Corp., 270 
F.3d 863, 887 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
27.   Id. 
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or possession.”28 The innocent-landowner defense applies only when a 
private, nongovernmental purchaser did not have actual or constructive 
knowledge of contamination at the time of purchase, or when the facility 
was acquired by inheritance.29 The court recognized that SARA “clarified” 
that a third party can include prior owners whose acts or omissions 
occurred in the past.30 The court reasoned that “a defendant landowner has 
a contractual relationship with all previous landowners—or, at least all 
previous landowners in the chain of title—unless the defendant-landowner 
can qualify for the innocent-landowner defense.”31 
Additionally, the court addressed the role of state law in the 
analysis of whether a contractual relationship existed between Davis and 
Westside.32 The court found no “plain indication”33 that Congress intended 
that state law should be used to interpret whether an instrument or 
transaction creates a contractual relationship under SARA.34 Accordingly, 
the court used the federal CERCLA statutes to ascertain whether the 
transactions related to Davis’s and Westside’s property interests amounted 
to a contractual relationship.35 
B. Contractual Relationship 
The court then analyzed Westside’s tax-sale purchase through two 
lenses, both of which led to the same conclusion: a contractual relationship 
existed between Westside and Davis.36 Because a tax sale could be viewed 
as either a single or two transactions—one between the government and 
the defaulting landowner and another between the government and the 
subsequent purchaser receiving a new title—the court clarified that under 
California’s tax sale structure, the government never acquires a possessory 
interest in tax-defaulted property sold at an auction to a private party.37  
To begin, the court assessed the relationship between Westside 
and Davis under a single transaction view.38 The court determined that the 
definition of “contractual relationship” should be broadly construed.39 The 
                                                     
28. Id. at 1091–1092 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)) (emphasis added). 
29.  Id. at 1092 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)). 
30.  Id. (citing Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 887). 
31.  Id. (citing Buffalo Marine Servs. Inc. v. United States, 663 F.3d 750, 
755, 758 (5th Cir. 2011) (referring to the Oil Pollution Act); United 
States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 716 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 
U.S. 30, 43 (1989)). 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. at 1094. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. at 1095. 
39.  Id. (citing San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Haugrud, 848 
F.3d 1216, 1229 (9th Cir. 2017) (The contractual relationship 
definition “contains both an ‘includes, but is not limited to’ clause 
and a ‘catch-all’ clause.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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court looked at use of the phrase “other involuntary transfer” under the 
definition of “contractual relationship” and found that it necessarily 
implies that a contractual relationship can exist even where property is 
transferred without both parties’ consent, such as a tax sale.40 Because the 
tax deed divested Davis’s interest in the Site and vested Westside with the 
right to possession, the property was transferred, albeit involuntarily, 
through a tax collector; the court found that this involuntary transfer fit 
within the accepted and broad “contractual relationship” definition.41 
Next, the court concluded that a contractual relationship existed 
even if the tax sale was construed as two transactions.42 While the 
relationship between the state and Westside was clearly a direct 
contractual relationship, the court looked to the innocent-landowner 
defense again to clarify that a contractual relationship also existed between 
Davis and the state.43 Because that exception only applies if the defendant 
is a government entity, the court found that the state’s acquisition of tax-
delinquent property constituted an involuntary transfer.44 
Ultimately and through a comprehensive view of CERCLA, the 
court determined that Congress, by narrowly construing the innocent-
landowner defense and broadly defining “contractual relationship,” did 
not mean for CERCLA to apply to tax sale purchasers differently from 
others.45 Rather, the court concluded that Congress intended the innocent-
landowner defense to be the sole defense for private buyers of land 
contaminated by previous owners, quoting the EPA’s own statement that 
“‘there is no authority anywhere in CERCLA that would support the 
laundering of liability’ through a mechanism such as a tax sale.”46  
Accordingly, the court held that Westside, the tax-sale purchaser, 
had a contractual relationship with Davis, the pre-tax-sale owner, with 
regard to the Site’s transfer.47 In doing so, the court rejected Westside’s 
three arguments that it had no relationship of any kind with Davis, that the 
tax sale broke the chain of title, and that extending “contractual 
relationship” to include a tax sale would render the third-party defense 
                                                     
40.  Id. (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 8601(35)(A); Penn Terra Ltd. V. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
41.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)). 
42.  Id. at 1095–1096. 
43.  Id. at 1096. 
44.  Id. (construing 42 U.S.C. 9601(35)(A)(ii)) (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 
9601(20)(D) and 40 C.F.R. § 300.1105(a)). 
45.  Id. at 1097 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“goal when construing complex regulatory 
statute is to ‘interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent 
regulatory scheme and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious 
whole’”); Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 880, 883 (Through the 
contractual relationship definition, Congress added the innocent-
landowner defense, intending narrow applicability for fear of abuse.). 
46.  Id. at 1098 (citing National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan; Lender Liability under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 
18,344, 18,372–18,373) (Apr. 29, 1992)). 
47.  Id. at 1100. 
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meaningless.48 The court stated that, because Congress explicitly defined 
“contractual relationship,” its definition controlled.49 Further, the court 
reiterated that state law did not govern, and thus, the chain of title 
argument was moot because it already found an indirect contractual 
relationship through the involuntary tax-sale transfer.50 Finally, the court 
clarified that the “traditional” CERCLA third-party defense applies where 
the property was previously contaminated, but only by “true” third parties 
like vandals or midnight dumpers, or was contaminated “after the 
defendant acquired the property.”51  
C. In Connection With 
Westside argued that Davis’s acts and omissions which 
contaminated the Site did not occur “in connection with a contractual 
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant,” entitling 
it to CERCLA’s third-party defense.52 The court found Westside’s narrow 
interpretation of “in connection with” incompatible with Congress’s intent 
for the innocent-landowner defense; such a reading would allow nearly 
every defendant to escape liability by claiming that the real-estate contract 
or deed did not “relate to . . . hazardous substances.”53 Instead, the court 
determined that where a defendant-landowner raises a liability defense due 
to a previous owner or possessor’s acts or omissions, the “in connection 
with” requirement is intended only to limit liability transfer where the 
“previous owner’s polluting acts or omissions were unrelated to its status 
as a landowner.”54 Because the court found that Davis released hazardous 
pollutants as owner of the Site, it determined, those acts occurred “‘in 
connection with’ its contractual relationship with [Westside].”55 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision in California Department of Toxic Substances 
Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC means CERCLA’s third-party defense 
will rarely apply to tax-sale real estate buyers attempting to assert that 
defense in response to a cost recovery action, at least those under Ninth 
Circuit jurisdiction. Precedent now limits that defense while establishing 
the constructive notice requirement is easily satisfied. Though extensive 
due diligence is usually difficult to conduct in a tax auction setting given 
their rapid-fire nature, the ruling nevertheless reminds buyers of both their 
environmental responsibilities and their responsibility to investigate. 
                                                     
48.  Id. at 1099. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
52.  Id. at 1099–1100 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (Court raising a 
limiting principle because “connections” are indeterminate). 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. at 1101 (emphasis added). 
55.  Id. 
